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The paper examines the impact of oil and gas price shocks on bank performance in the major oil 
and gas exporting GCC countries, using data for the period 2000-2017. Results indicate that oil 
and gas price rises have a direct bearing on bank performance through the channel of price-
induced bank deposits and related lending to business activities. The negative impact on bank 
performance due to a drop in oil and gas prices is greater than the positive effect of a rise in 
prices. Findings suggest that oil and gas price volatility has an asymmetric effect on conventional 
and Islamic banks. Conventional banks reap more benefit from the increased cash flow created 
by oil and gas prices, compared to Islamic banks. While Islamic banks are generally vulnerable 
to adverse oil and gas price shocks, conventional banks tend to benefit more from positive oil 
and gas price shocks. The association between oil and gas price shocks and bank performance in 
GCC has been distorted by the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and the ongoing Yemen 
War, which have lowered performance. The findings of the study have significant policy 
implications for the central banks as well as the governments in the oil and gas-exporting 
countries. 
 
Keywords: Oil and gas price shocks, Global financial crisis, Arab Spring, Yemen War, Bank 
performance, oil-exporting countries. 
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Energy plays a vital role in stimulating national growth. Crude oil, as well as natural gas, 
are the two key ingredients in the production process and hence their price volatility has 
discernible effects on the real economy (Narayan and Gupta, 2015). These two commodities are 
also recognized as of vital importance to both economic activities and financial markets 
(Morana, 2017). Lee and Lee (2019) argue that rises in oil and gas price adversely affect the 
performance of Chinese banks in terms of capitalization, managerial efficiency, liquidity, and the 
power of earnings. However, the authors also argue that economic and political stability in a 
country can nullify these adverse effects. Al-khazali and Mirzaei (2017) argue that oil and gas 
price rises can adversely affect bank performance due to the rise in delinquencies and corporate 
failures and hence the rise in the level of non-performing loans in banks’ books. Kilian (2008) 
argues that a decrease in the off-balance sheet business of banks due to the negative impact of oil 
and gas prices on macro-economic aggregates (investment and consumption) also affects bank 
performance. Poghosyan and Hesse (2016) argue that oil and gas prices can impact the economic 
growth of the oil and gas exporting nation through both indirect and direct channels. Increased 
lending in oil and gas-related activities, according to the authors, directly boosts bank earnings. 
Moreover, improved oil and gas-related earnings in oil and gas-exporting economies in an 
environment of rising oil and gas prices boost the fiscal spending of the concerned government, 
including its investments in additional infrastructure. These, in turn, result in increased corporate 
activities and increased lending by banks to the corporates, and hence improved profitability in 
the banking sector. Moreover, improved business sentim t during this phase feeds into 
increased demand, improved corporate performance, low non-performing loans, and hence 
improved bank performance. This phenomenon was evident during 2005-2008 when the 
governments in oil and gas-exporting nations embarked on major investment activities in their 
endeavour to diversify their economies and also improve human capital (Poghosyan and Hesse, 
2016). Healthy profitability of banks during this period enabled them to strengthen their capital 
base and ensured financial stability in the respectiv  ountries. 
The global financial crisis was accompanied by a sharp fall in oil and gas prices. It has hit 
hard many of the oil and gas-exporting countries worldwide. There was a dramatic fall in their 
exports, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), equity prices, prices of real estate, and government 
revenues. These, in turn, resulted in fiscal imbalances, drop in corporate performances, and have 
finally affected the health of banks in those countries. Moreover, as banks in some of these 
economies were heavily exposed to the real estate sector, the concerned governments had to 
intervene to stabilize the situation (Khandelwal, Miyajima, and Santos, 2016; Poghosyan and 
Hesse, 2016). 
Given the dependence of oil and gas-exporting countries on these exports, the linkage 
between oil and gas prices and bank performance and its impact on systemic stability is of 
primary concern to policy planners. In this paper, we address three key questions: Do oil and gas 
price shocks influence bank performance? Is there an asymmetric effect between positive and 
negative oil and gas price shocks on bank performance? Does the impact differ between 
conventional and Islamic banks, because Islamic banks operate according to the principles of 
Islamic law? This paper attempts to be among the earliest to provide empirical evidence on these 
crucial issues. To address these research questions, we use a two-step generalized method of 





and gas price shocks on bank performance. We use a dataset of 70 commercial banks in major oil 
and gas-exporting countries over the period 2000-20171. 
The empirical literature has focused on analyzing the impact of oil and gas prices on 
macro-economic indicators or stock market returns (Hamilton, 2009; Guerrero-Escobar et al., 
2018, among others). There is little work on the relationship between oil price shocks and bank 
performance (Poghosyan and Hesse, 2016; Lee and Lee, 2019). Poghosyan and Hesse (2016) 
analyzed the effect of oil price shocks on the banks’ profitability in MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) countries for the period 1994-2007 (before the financial crisis). However, they 
used only one dependent variable, return on assets (ROA), to measure profitability. They failed 
to take into account the market-based shareholder value (Tobin’s Q) which reflects the 
discounted value of current and potential future earnings (De Jonghe and Vennet, 2008). Nor did 
they study whether oil price increases and decreases have asymmetric effects on bank 
performance. Although the gas sector still plays a significant role in the economic growth of the 
Arab region, these authors did not consider the effct of gas price shocks on bank profitability. 
For example, at the time of the global financial crisis of 2008 Qatargas had seven LNG mega-
trains, of which four are the largest in the world, each with a production capacity of 7.8 MTA, 
accounting for almost 38% of the overall GDP of Qatar (Saif-Alyousfi et al., 2018a, 2018b). 
However, Poghosyan and Hesse’s study period did not go beyond the global financial crisis, 
which includes the period of political instability witnessed in the region due to the Arab Spring 
revolution and the Yemen War. These turmoils have had a significant impact on the oil and gas 
prices, economic growth, and the financial performances of banks in the region. Our study 
covers these periods as well as the period of the financial crisis. Overall, authors do not consider 
the role of political risk (Arab Spring and Yemen), although political risk reflects the ability and 
willingness of a country to service its governance obligations. The lack of empirical evidence on 
the topic is particularly surprising, given the growing awareness of national risk assessments, as 
well as the close link among national risks and economic performance. 
Lee and Lee (2019) focus on the role of oil price in bank performance in China, the 
largest importer of crude oil and other energy liquids in the world. However, we investigate the 
GCC countries for several reasons. First, GCC economies are oil and gas-based and are the 
major suppliers of oil and gas in the world. World Bank data shows that the oil and the gas 
reserves in the GCC region account for approximately 52% and 41% respectively globally. 
Moreover, GCC accounts for 49.1% of the total crude production of Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In GCC countries, oil and gas account for about 41% of 
their GDP, 63% of total government revenue, and 73% of total export earnings. It is therefore 
quite natural to note that GCC markets are susceptibl  o fluctuations in oil prices and the 
                                                          
1   Banks are an integral part of the financial system of any country and hence the economy. An efficient banking 
system is crucial for effective monetary policy transmission, especially in developing economies, which are mainly 
bank-based because of their underdeveloped capital markets. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain) have one of the largest banking markets 
in Arab and MENA countries. The GCC banking sector represents the primary source of financial intermediation in 
these economies, accounting for 86% of the total assets of the financial system in the region over the period 2000-
2018. Moreover, the banking stocks in the GCC region are also the most heavily traded ones in the GCC stock 
markets. In 2018 the total assets of the banking sector amounted to US$2.1 trillion. Recent trading data (BankScope) 
in GCC stock markets indicates that in view of the profitability expectations of the banking sector, foreign investors’ 
trade activities amounted to US$ 0.475 trillion, dominated by banking stocks. The GCC banking sector is f crucial 






accompanying oil and gas price-induced income-generati g activities of banks. Second, the GCC 
banking market is concentrated, with very few banks dominating the market place. Third, the 
combined Tier 1 capital of the top 50 GCC banks amounts to only 1.7% of the capital of the top 
1,000 world banks, indicating the possible vulnerability of the GCC banks to possible shocks. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) also show that the level of bank profitability is quite low 
in the oil-exporting economies, although it is crucial to economic growth. Fourth, Al-Hassan et 
al. (2010) show that financial markets in the region exhibit some common structural 
characteristics and hence are more likely to suffer from common shocks. Fifth, the GCC 
economy tripled in size from US$836 billion in 2007 to US$1,077 billion in 2008, a growth of 
29%. In 2009, however, the global financial crisis had resulted in a drop in global oil demand 
which adversely affected the GCC economies. Sixth, in their effort to reduce systemic risk, 
banking regulators across this region have graduate to international standards of capital 
adequacy. During the financial crisis, despite the supportive policies of the region’s central 
banks, there were failures of a few non-banking financial institutions and family business groups. 
Seventh, GCC stock markets provide promising areas for international portfolio diversification 
(Arouri and Rault, 2012). GCC countries, however, are sensitive to regional political events 
(Hammoudeh and Li, 2008), and oil and gas price shocks adversely affect corporate performance 
and finally the domestic share prices. 
We contribute to the empirical literature in several ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first of its kind to examine the effect of oil and gas price shocks on 
bank performance using four proxies: Tobin's Q, returns on equity (ROE), ROA, and net interest 
margins (NIM) in major oil and gas-exporting countries. These measures allow us to provide a 
more comprehensive assessment of the effect of energy prices on bank performance, and also to 
find appropriate proxies to measure bank performance. Second, this study is the first to introduce 
the price volatility and price shocks of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price, Brent 
crude oil price, and natural gas price as a systemic variable into the analytical framework. We 
also use different definitions of the shocks to asses  the robustness of the results. Third, we are 
the first to examine the asymmetric (positive and negative) effect of oil and gas price shocks on 
bank performance. Moreover, the price rises and falls may have an unequal impact on bank 
performance. We also examine the asymmetric (positive and negative) effect of oil and gas price 
shocks on the performance of Islamic and conventional banks. Finally, this study is the first of its 
kind to control for the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, the Arab Spring revolution, 
and the Yemen War on the performance of GCC banks ad its linkage to the prices of oil and 
gas. The interactions between these three crises and the oil and gas price shocks are also 
considered. Increase in the level of political instability distorts the resource allocation decisions 
of firms and results in the postponement of investmnt and production decisions. This, in turn, 
exerts a negative influence on the performances of the banks. Political instability in the major oil 
and gas-exporting economies is likely to have an adverse influence on the oil and gas price 
movements, create macro-economic disorder, and finally adversely affect bank performance. The 
findings of this study are expected to provide crucial insight towards the formulation of 
appropriate policy interventions. 
Our empirical analysis finds that oil and gas price shocks, irrespective of the oil indices 
used or the definition of the shocks, have a direct impact on the performance of all banks at the 
aggregate level as well as on conventional and Islamic banks. The effect is, however, more 
prominent in the case of the performance of conventional banks. In general, our empirical results 





affect bank performance directly via increased oil-related lending or business activity. We also 
find that adverse shocks have a greater impact than positive shocks. Moreover, oil and gas price 
movements exert different influences on the performance of conventional as opposed to Islamic 
banks. While Islamic banks are generally vulnerable to adverse oil and gas price shocks, 
conventional banks tend to benefit more from favourable shocks. We also find that the 
association between oil and gas price shocks with bank performance has been distorted by the 
global financial crisis, Arab Spring, and the Yemen War. This suggests that while evaluating 
bank performance during the period under study, one has to take into account the possible 
impacts of such crises.  
In Section 2 of the paper we review related literature on bank performance and oil and 
gas prices. In Section 3 we develop the research model and elucidate the parameters used in our 
study. In Section 4 we illustrate the methodology and provide the sample description. In Section 




2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
 
2.1. Related literature 
 
The impact of oil price on economic growth and stock market returns has been studied 
extensively by researchers and is an area of keen int rest to economists, policy planners and 
environmentalists alike. It is noted that the impact of oil and gas price is more evident in 
developed and developing economies than in the less d veloped countries. There is wide 
variation in the causality results among these studies, given the different model specifications 
and the stage of economic development of individual countries. The effect oil price shocks on 
economic growth is also found to be asymmetric  
 There is however, only a few studies analyze the impact of oil price changes on bank 
performance. Using ROA, Poghosyan and Hesse (2016) in their study of bank performance in 
MENA oil-exporting countries find that shock in oil price has an indirect effect on the 
profitability of banks, which is channelled through country-specific institutional and macro-
economic variables. The authors also find that the eff ct is more pronounced in the case of 
investment banks compared to conventional or Islamic banks. Lee and Lee (2019) study the 
impacts of oil prices on bank performance through a broad array of capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management, earnings, and liquidity in China over the period 2000-2014. They find oil 
prices have a significant impact on bank capitalization, management efficiency, earning power, 
and liquidity. Al-khazali and Mirzaei (2017) and Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018a) find that oil price 
movements have a significant effect on the level of n n-performing loans of banks in oil-
exporting nations. Khandelwal et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between world i  price 
fluctuations and financial developments in the GCC countries. They find strong links between oil 
price movements and bank balance sheets. Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018b) also find that a higher 
growth rate of oil and gas prices is associated with a rise in the bank deposits ratio in Qatar. We 
complement these studies by investigating from a global perspective how changes in oil and gas 







2.2. Hypothesis development 
 
It is noted in the literature that the oil and gas price affects economic performance, 
although the impact varies from country to country. Foon and Abosedra (2014) argue that in the 
growth hypothesis, energy bears unidirectional causality with economic growth. The 
conservation hypothesis, on the contrary, suggests that economic growth results in energy 
consumption. According to the feedback hypothesis, thi  interrelationship is bi-directional, and 
hence a dual strategy is needed to stimulate economic growth and avoid energy wastage. The 
neutrality hypothesis, however, posits that the relationship between economic growth and energy 
is independent of each other. Killian and Park (2009) argue that oil-specific demand shocks 
result in an adverse effect on economic variables, contrary to the positive effect of the demand-
side shock at the aggregate level. However, there is general agreement that supply-side shocks 
have either adverse or insignificant effects on economic parameters, while demand-side shocks 
seemingly have positive effects in both the long and short term (Lippi and Nobili, 2012; 
Hamilton, 2009). The literature is, however, silent o  the possible impact of oil and gas price 
shocks on bank performance in countries where growth in banking is led by oil and gas prices. 
There is, therefore, a yawning gap in the research work in this arena (Poghosyan and Hesse, 
2016). 
Oil and gas revenues are the dominant components of the income of the GCC economies. 
A rise in oil price, therefore, has a positive impact on the balance of payments, foreign exchange 
reserves, and finally, the fiscal expenditure of the governments of these economies, resulting in 
GDP growth. Bruckner et al. (2012) argue that a rise in oil prices results in faster growth in the 
GDP of countries with significant net oil exports. Increased investments and growth in output 
result in an improvement in productivity and, hence, b tter corporate performance. The increased 
transfer of income from oil and gas-importing economies results in higher household demands 
for goods and services, which in turn results in increased output. In effect, the financial position 
of companies is strengthened through the channels of both demand and supply. Banks’ exposure 
to these firms also increases, as does their profitability. However, a consequent dip in the price of 
oil adversely affects the financial position of corp ates, and as a result they start defaulting on 
their loan commitments, leading to a high level of n n-performing loans in banks’ asset books. 
The higher level of non-performing loans and related write-offs strains the financial performance 
of banks. Poghosyan and Hesse (2016) find that the impact of oil prices on bank performance in 
oil-rich economies is mainly driven indirectly by changes in economic activities following 
changes in oil prices. 
Nevertheless, the impact of oil price movements on ba k non-performing loans could be 
heterogeneous across banks, depending on bank specialization. The banking space in the GCC 
economies is shared between conventional and Islamic banks. Unlike conventional banks, 
Islamic banks rely on Sukuk, apart from Shariah-compliant deposits for their funding 
requirements. In an environment of rising oil and gas prices, higher liquidity in the financial 
system results in a rise in deposits in both conventional and Islamic banks. However, while 
conventional banks aggressively lend the increased flow of oil and gas-induced deposits, in 
Islamic banks the increase in deposits goes mainly into investments. In a falling oil and gas price 
environment, however, Islamic banks, which mainly rel  on wholesale funding, suffer more from 
liquidity squeeze than conventional banks which rely mainly on stable retail deposits to meet 
their funding requirements. However, falling oil and gas prices hurt the financial health of firms 





fell from its peak of US$145.3 a barrel in 2008 to US$58.5 by the end of 2017. Islamic Banks are 
therefore expected to suffer more from the squeeze in liquidity in the market, but to suffer less 
from the failing health of corporate entities compared to conventional banks2. In general, we 
expect a significant association between oil and gas price shocks and the performance of banks 
in oil and gas-exporting countries. Our hypotheses ar  as follows: 
 
H1: There is no relation between oil and gas price shocks and bank performance in oil and gas 
exporting nations 
H1a: The effects of oil and gas price shocks on the performance of conventional and Islamic 
banks are heterogeneous. 





3. Dependent and independent variables  
 
3.1. Dependent variables 
 
We use Tobin’s Q and ROE as main measures of bank performance. Tobin (1969) 
explains the association between the current replacment cost of assets to the market value of 
assets involving stocks and shares. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio market value of common 
equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Fu et al. (2014) and 
Saif-Alyousfi (2019) argue that Tobin’s Q is commonly used as a proxy of bank performance 
since it reflects the market’s expectations of profits. Our second measure of performance ROE 
measured as net profit divided by average total equity. ROE can be defined as ROA adjusted by 
the leverage amount. It is also used in the finance literature to measure bank performance (Chen 






                                                          
2 Islamic banks operate according to the principles of Islamic law. One might argue that these banks have more 
resources and sufficient power to absorb liquidity from the market, and hence may be more resilient to adverse oil 
price shocks. It may also be argued that Islamic banks, which are usually private, are in general more efficient, 
innovative and have less bureaucratic management structures. Therefore, Islamic banks may be less vulnerable to 
the poor performance of non-financial firms following oil price shocks. On the other hand, conventional banks in 
developing countries, such as GCC countries, are usually stated-owned. Governments may increase the resilience of 
these banks during periods of financial stress through capital infusion. 
3 Following Chen and Liao (2011), we also use ROA andNIM as measure of bank performance. ROA measured as 
the ratio of net profit to average total assets; it is a measure of the profit earned from each dollar f investment in 
assets. More importantly, it indicates the capacity of the bank’s management to use its financial resources to 
generate profit. These authors argue that financial institutions use leverage to increase ROE; leverage does not, 
however, affect ROA and hence is a better measure of the ability of banks to generate returns on their assets. NIM is 
the net interest income (interest income minus interest expense) divided by total assets. While ROA and ROE reflect 
the ability of banks to use their financial resources, NIM focuses on the earnings generated from interes -bearing 





3.2. Independent variables 
 
3.2.1. Oil and gas prices shocks 
 
There is no single measure in the literature that my constitute oil and gas price shock 
(Hamilton, 2003, 2008; Kilian, 2008; Poghosyan and Hesse, 2016). Thus, in line with Poghosyan 
and Hesse (2016), we use five different proxies to measure the oil and gas price shocks using 
daily oil spot and natural gas and 12-month forward r tes collected from Bloomberg.4 
 
The relationship of growth in oil and gas prices does not indicate whether the changes in 
price are consistent with the changes in fundamentals. We use the following additional 
formulations to include this dimension: 
 
Oil and gas price deviations from their underlying trend: (proxied by the Hodrick-
Prescott filter,  ) 
	
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It has however been argued by Poghosyan and Hesse (2016) that these formulations only 
reflect the degree to which underlying forces cannot explain the changes in oil and gas prices. 
We therefore finally use the measure of the net increase in oil and gas price specified by 
Hamilton (2003): 
	1
 =  
∑ 1	2 0, ,  − 1	2*3!,'()45 !,6#'()*!
365  
 
 Hamilton (2003) argues that oil and gas prices per se are not exogenous to macro-
economic development. What is exogenous is the non-li ear transformation (the amount by 
which oil and gas prices exceed the maximum level that they reached in the previous year) of the 
same.  
There are two main benchmark indices for crude oil price: WTI and UK Brent. Given the 
relative liquidity of WTI and its price transparency, it attained the status of the key benchmark 
for pricing (Purvin and Gertz, 2010). Brent crude oil, with its origins in the UK, is considered to 
                                                          
4
 The annual percentage change is calculated using the yearly average of spot prices (): 
78	 9
	: 9ℎ	: =  
 −  !
 ! ∗ 100  
The average annual growth rate is calculated using the arithmetic mean of daily 12-month growth rates of spot 
prices (): 
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be the other dominant oil benchmark. From the advantage of its location in the North Sea, the 
Brent benchmark strategically serves two important refining centres, Europe and the US. Fattouh 
(2011) stresses that under the UK government regimes Br nt is considered to be a transparent 
benchmark for pricing. As GCC countries are key memb rs of OPEC (Kontaxis, 2016) we have 
used both WTI and Brent as reference oil price parameters to check the robustness of our results: 
Brent as an alternative to WTI has a similar effect on the growth of bank performance in oil-




3.2.2 Control variables  
 
We include several control variables in our analysis. We consider six bank-specific 
characteristics have influence bank performance (Saif-Alyousfi, 2019; Saif-Alyousfi et al., 
2018c; Fu et al. 2014; Chen and Liao, 2011). First, cost-income ratio: this is operating expenses 
divided by total income. This ratio measures the influence of operating efficiency on bank 
performance. The lower the value of this ratio the higher is the efficiency of bank management in 
terms of generating income per unit of operational expenses. Thus, a negative sign can be 
expected for this variable. Second, on-interest revenue: the ratio of non-interest revenue to total 
revenue, it measures the extent to which a bank is oriented towards non-traditional banking 
activities. The ratio can be positive if a bank uses its technical abilities to offer non-fund based 
product lines to generate non-interest income. It can be negative if a bank is oriented more 
towards traditional banking activities such as industrial and commercial lending. Hence, the sign 
of this variable is expected to be ambiguous. Third, liquidity risk: the ratio of net loans to 
customers and short-term funding is used to measure the liquidity risk. The lower the ratio, the 
lower the liquidity risk; consequently, the higher the liquidity of banks the lower are bank 
profits. Hence, a positive sign is expected. Fourth, non-performing loans: the ratio of impaired 
loans to total loan ratio is included to reflect the effect of credit risk on bank performance. A 
lower ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans indicates lower credit risk and, hence, better 
bank performance. Therefore, we expect a negative sign between bank performance and this 
variable. Fifth, capital adequacy ratio: capital adequacy ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets 
and is used as a measure of the strength of the capital position of banks5. Banks with a higher 
capital adequacy ratio are considered safer, as it exerts a positive influence on bank performance. 
Therefore, a positive sign of this ratio in relation to bank performance is expected. Sixth, bank 
size: the natural logarithm of bank assets is used to measur  bank size. Smaller banks are likely 
to have less loan diversification and products range than larger banks. Larger banks may enjoy 
economies of scale. However, in a highly competitive environment, larger banks may have lower 
profits. Therefore, the impact of bank size on its performance can be ambiguous.  
We also introduce three macro-economic variables (GDP growth, fiscal stance, and 
inflation rate) that may affect bank performance (Chen and Liao, 2011). First, GDP growth: 
GDP growth is a proxy of the level of economic activity in an economy, and it has an impact on 
the growth of bank deposits and demand for loans. During an economic upturn, there is likely to 
be a higher demand for bank credit which is expected to result in improved bank performance. 
                                                          
5 Tier 1 or (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) divided by risk-weighted assets may be more robust. However, Saif-Alyousfi et al. 






However, faster economic growth leads to higher competition resulting in a reduced margin and 
hence reduced bank profit. Therefore, the relationship between bank performance and GDP 
growth is expected to be ambiguous. Second, fiscal stance: in most oil and gas-exporting 
countries, the governments’ budgetary expenditures a  driven primarily by oil and gas-related 
revenues. Hence, we use the fiscal surplus/deficit to GDP as an additional control variable. The 
ratio is expected to have a positive relationship wth bank profitability. The third variable is 
inflation rate: we use the current period consumer price index growth rate as a proxy for inflation 
to analyze the impact of macro-economic risk on bank performance. The association between 
inflation rate and bank performance depends on the ability of banks to anticipate the inflation 
rate and adjust their interest rates accordingly. The relationship between bank performance and 
inflation rate, therefore, cannot be determined on an a priori basis and hence is ambiguous. 
In addition to the control variable on bank characteris ics and the macro-economic 
situation, our analysis incorporates Herfindahl index and stock market capitalization as the main 
financial indicators influencing bank performance (Chen and Liao, 2011; Mirzaei t al., 2013). 
First, the Herfindahl index: we use this as a proxy for the market concentration of the banking 
sector. It is equal to the sum of the squares of each b nk’s total assets divided by total banking 
sector assets. The hypothesis of structure-conduct-performance (SCP) indicates that banks in 
deeply concentrated markets collude and achieve monopoly profits; they tend to pay lower 
interest rates to depositors and charge higher interest rates on loans. In contrast, a higher 
concentration of banks may result in intense competition in the banking sector, which will lead to 
a negative relationship between market concentration and bank performance (Saif-Alyousfi et 
al., 2018c). Accordingly, the impact of market concentration on bank performance is unclear. 
Second, stock market capitalization: stock market capitalization to GDP is used to measure the 
equity market size and is also a measure of the financial market development. Levine (1997) 
argues that the growth of the stock markets allows banks to obtain higher profit margins. 
However, with the development of the stock market, borrowers have better access to meet their 
funding requirements, resulting in stiffer competition between banks that lower return. Thus, the 
expected coefficient of this variable is indeterminate. Table 1 shows a list of our variables and 
definitions. 
 
[ Insert Table 1 here] 
 




The data used in this study are gathered from various sources. Data relating to bank-
specific characteristics are collected from BankScope Fitch IBCA to create a sample consisting 
of an unbalanced panel of annual period series from 2000 to 2017, including the 2008-2009 
financial turmoil. Following Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018c) and Saif-Alyousfi (2019) study of GCC 
banks, we focus only on banks listed on GCC stock ex hanges. The sample in this study consists 
of 70 listed banks (45 conventional and 25 Islamic banks) in the six GCC economies: the UAE 
(20), Bahrain (13), Saudi Arabia (11), Kuwait (10), Oman (8), and Qatar (8). We collect country-
level data on the inflation rate, GDP growth, and the fiscal stance as macro-economic factors, 
and Herfindahl index and stock market capitalization as financial structure indicators from the 





Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables across all countries in our 
study. It also reports the mean value of every variable for whole banks for every country. The 
banks in our study show the average of Tobin’s Q as 0.48; ROE 12%; ROA 1.86%; and NIM 
3.14%, across the whole period 2000-2017. Large diff rences in the summary statistics of bank 
performance across the GCC economies are reflected in Table 2. Therefore, controlling bank-
specific characteristics, macro-economic, and industry factors is crucial to understanding the 
determinants of bank performance. In addition, testing for country-specific characteristics may 
lead us to more robust results. 
The correlations amongst the variables as presented i  Table 3 reflect the degree to which 
the independent variables are correlated. Apart from multicollinearity amongst the measures of 
WTI oil, Brent oil, and gas (0.98, 0.86 and 0.79 respectively), there is no issue with the other 
independent variables. However, in our formulation, the alternative measures of oil and gas price 
shock do not enter the model simultaneously. Our study is, therefore, quite different from that of 
Poghosyan and Hesse (2016), which used only the Brent oil price. The correlation of oil and gas 
price shocks with bank variables (Tobin's Q, ROE, ROA, and bank size) and macro-economic 
variables (GDP growth and fiscal stance) in our analysis appears to be high (Table 3). Such a 
high level of correlation reflects the fact that oil and gas prices have a substantial impact on 
macro-economic development and bank performance in oil and gas-exporting nations, and needs 
close examination. 
 
[ Insert Table 2 here] 




To examine the determinants of bank performance, we follow Lee and Lee (2019), Saif-
Alyousfi (2019), Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018a, 2018b, 2018c), Al-khazali and Mirzaei (2017), 
Poghosyan and Hesse (2016), Fu et al. (2014), and Chen and Liao (2011), and use the equation 
of a dynamic linear model (1):  















+ ε?@A                            (1)  
where i, j, and t indices denote bank, country, and time, respectively; PERF is bank performance 
proxied by four different proxies Tobin’s Q, ROE, ROA, and NIM and. β0 is a constant term; 
OIL is the oil price shocks indicators; GAS is the natural gas price shocks indicators; BAN is the 
bank-specific factors; MAC is the macro-economic variables; FIN is the financial structure 
indicators; and ε is the error term.  
 Saif-Alyousfi (2019), Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018a, 2018b, 2018c), and Poghosyan and 
Hesse (2016) argue that study of bank performance det rminants may suffer from endogeneity 
bias, omitted variables and the strong persistence of bank profit. They argue that the persistent 
profit reflects the barriers to market competition a d sensitivity of the information to macro-
economic collapse, which is serially related. To solve these possible problems, the authors use 





which is bank performance with a lag of one period an i the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. 
The authors also argue that a value of i between 0 and 1 indicates bank profit persistence, which 
finally returns to its normal level. A value close to 1 suggests that the competitive structure of the 
banking industry is less, while a value close to 0 indicates that the structure is competitive. 
 Saif-Alyousfi (2019) and Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018c) argue that banks with more profit 
may be able to improve their capital via retained earnings. However, more profitable banks also 
employ more personnel and spend more money on promoti nal activities to grow in size, which 
results in lowering their operational efficiency. It is suggested that one can solve these problems 
using GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995). GMM addresses the endogeneity problem, unobserved 
heterogeneity, and the dependent variable persistence. It uses lagged values of independent and 
dependent variables in variance instruments.  
Given the several problems in the determinants of bank profitability including 
endogeneity, autocorrelation, unobserved heterogeneity, and profit persistence that cannot be 
solved by fixed effect (Saif-Alyousfi, 2019), we use the GMM estimator in this paper. Fixed and 
random effects are biased in a dynamic model of panel data. Furthermore, the pooled ordinary 
least square is biased and inconsistent even if εit is not serially associated. GMM is more efficient 
than two-stage least squares because it accounts for heteroscedasticity (Hall, 2005). 
The GMM estimator has two variants: the difference GMM estimator and the system 
GMM estimator. We use the latter because it is more r bust in assessing efficiency gains and 
reducing finite sample bias. System GMM also addresses the unit root property problem and 
provides more accurate findings (Bond, 2002). The system GMM estimator has one- and two-
step alternatives. Following the studies of Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018c) and Saif-Alyousfi (2019), 
we use the two-step system by Windmeijer (2005), due to lower bias and standard errors. It is 
also more efficient than the one-step estimator because it is more robust to the problem of weak 
instruments. 
As the number of years (t) in our study is 18, the us of the GMM estimator of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) is justifiable. We examine the validity of the instruments via the Sargan-test of 
over-identifying restrictions and a test of the absence of residuals serial correlation. 
 
5. Empirical results  
 
5.1. Baseline results 
 
In Table 4, we report the empirical results of the regression analysis of Tobin’s Q and 
ROE. However, to save space, we do not report the results of ROA and NIM6. Table 4 consists 
of two panels: Panel A presents the regression results of Brent oil price shocks, while the 
regression results of natural gas price shocks are presented in Panel B7. More specifically, in 
Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 we present the regression results of oil and gas price shocks measured by 
deviation from their respective forward rates, while Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 report the regression 
results of oil and gas price shocks using Hamilton’s (2003) measure of oil shock8. 
                                                          
6 Results using ROA and NIM are similar to those for ROE. 
7 WTI oil price shock is also used and the results are similar to Brent oil price shocks.   
8 We also use other measures of oil and gas price shock  (annual percentage change, growth rate, and deviation from 
HP filter) but we do not report the results for thesake of brevity. The results are, however, available from the 





Our estimations indicate stable coefficients. The Wald-test shows the goodness of fit for 
the evaluated model, and the Sargan-test indicates that there is no evidence of over-identification 
restrictions. The analyses suggest the existence of a negative first-order autocorrelation; 
however, this does not mean that the assessments are inconsistent. Arellano and Bover (1995) 
argue that the inconsistency may be indicated if second-order autocorrelation is present. 
However, this case is rejected by the test for AR (2) errors, and hence the moment conditions of 
the model are valid (Table 4). The highly significant coefficient of our lagged dependent 
variables Tobin’s Q and ROE emphasizes the dynamic nature of the model specification and its 
significance across all models. It implies that there xists a high degree of bank shareholders 
value and profit persistence which justifies the dynamic nature of our model specification. 
According to Panel A of Table 4, in model 1, the estimated coefficient on the oil price 
shock, when calculated using deviation from the forward rate of oil price, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that rising oil prices increase bank shareholders’ 
value (Tobin’s Q). Moreover, the estimated coefficient of this variable, when using ROE as a 
dependent variable in model 3, is also positive and statistically highly significant. This further 
supports our argument that increases in oil prices strengthen the profitability and performance of 
banks in oil-exporting countries. Models 2 and 4 present the results of oil price shocks computed 
using Hamilton’s (2003) measure. We find that an increase in oil prices is associated with an 
increase in bank Tobin’s Q and ROE. The estimated coeffi ients on Hamilton’s measure are all 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels. This indicates that higher oil price is 
related to higher liquidity and higher deposit inflows which are then intermediated into lending 
resulting in increased bank profits. Furthermore, w find that all definitions of the Brent and 
WTI oil price shocks have a positive and significant relationship with all the bank performance 
indicators at the level of 1%. This confirms that the impact of the oil price shocks on bank 
performance is positive and significant regardless of the benchmark indices used for the crude oil 
price or the definition of the oil price shock. These robust results suggest that oil prices do 
impact bank performance in oil-exporting countries.  
These results are apparently not in line with Lee and Lee (2019) who find that high oil 
prices result in worse profitability. Their study is, however, on China which is one of the major 
importers of oil and gas, rather than on the oil-exporting GCC economies which are the focus of 
the present study.The authors argue that the fact th t a bank’s profitability responds negatively to 
oil price can be explained by its reduced balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities. On the 
one hand, a rise in oil price adversely impacts economic activity and the borrowers’ ability to 
meet their obligations, potentially weakening banks’ balance sheets. In addition, reduced 
household demand and investment activities adversely affect banks’ fee income, which leads to a 
decrease in off-balance sheet activities. However, Our results are consistent with those of 
Poghosyan and Hesse (2016), who find that oil prices have a significant effect on banks’ ROA in 
MENA markets over the period 1994-2007. 
Turning to gas price shocks, Columns 5 and 7 show that, measured by the forward rate, 
they have a positive and significant impact on bank Tobin’s Q and ROE at the level of 1%. 
Furthermore, Columns 6 and 8 report that, using Hamilton’s measure, the effect of gas price 
shocks on Tobin’s Q and ROE of banks is also positive and significant at 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. This indicates that gas prices shocks are indeed related to the performance of banks 
in the gas-exporting countries, regardless of the definition of the gas price shock. The higher the 
price of gas, the higher the performance of banks i oil and gas-exporting countries. It also 





borrowers and reduces the probability of their defaulting on their debt, increasing the banks’ 
profitability and shareholder value. 
The effects of oil and gas price movements on bank performance are economically 
relevant. For example, referring to Table 4 (Columns 1 and 3), it can be seen that the coefficient 
estimate of oil price (forward rates) suggests thata one standard deviation decrease in oil price 
(21.11) increases Tobin’s Q and ROE by 161.3% and 99.4%, respectively, with all other 
explanatory variables set at their mean values. This indicates that bank performance in oil-
exporting countries decreases during a period of significant decline in oil prices, as evident in 
recent years. Similarly, the coefficient estimate of gas prices in Columns 5 and 7 suggests that a 
one standard deviation decrease in gas price (23.72) translates into a 47.91% and 207.3% 
decrease in Tobin’s Q and ROE, holding all other explanatory variables constant at their means. 
Overall, the estimated coefficients on the oil and gas price shock variables, presented in 
Table 4, do not provide support for our hypothesis (H1): an increase in oil and gas prices 
improve the performance of banks in oil-exporting countries. 
In our analysis with the control variables, we report interesting findings. First, we find 
that cost efficiency results in improved bank performance. Second, the banks that are more 
engaged in non-traditional activities show better pformance, reflected in the improvement of 
Tobin’s Q and ROE. Third, a higher non-performing loans ratio is associated with lower Tobin’s 
Q and ROE. The negative perception of the depositors about the falling quality of the loans book 
in the down-cycle, which forces the banks to pay higher interest rates, finally results in lowering 
their performance. Fourth, better-capitalized banks are safer than those with lower capital ratios 
as these banks have the advantage of lower funding cost due to lower prospective bankruptcy 
cost. Fifth, we find no empirical evidence that larger commercial banks are better performers 
than small-sized banks. This indicates that larger banks are not able to benefit from higher 
product diversification or economies of scale. Sixth, using country variables, we find that the 
effect of GDP growth and stock market capitalization on bank performance is positive and highly 
significant, reflecting that banks perform better du ing economic prosperity and the growth of the 
stock market. We also find that higher fiscal stance of the government tends to result in better 
bank performance. The negative and significant effect of the inflation rate on bank performance 
reflects the inability of management to modulate thir performance in tune with inflationary 
expectations. Finally, we find no evidence to support the SCP hypothesis. Overall, while 
assessing the effect of oil and gas prices on bank performance, we find that the control variables 
in the form of bank-specific, financial structure, and the macro-economic variables included in 
our study also have an impact on bank performance. Th se findings with the control variables in 
our study are in line with the findings of earlier studies (e.g., Al-khazali & Mirzaei, 2017; Lee 
and Lee, 2019). 
 
                                             [ Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.2. Heterogeneous impacts 
 
To assess whether oil and gas price shocks exert the same influence on the performance 
of Islamic and conventional banks, we differentiate th  impact of oil and gas price shocks. We 
first introduce the Islamic bank dummy plus the interaction terms for oil and gas price shocks 
with Islamic banks. Second, we introduce interaction erms for oil and gas price shocks with both 





Brent oil price shocks, while Models 5-8 show the results for natural gas price shocks. Panel A 
shows the regression results when we introduce the Islamic bank dummy plus interaction terms 
for oil and gas price shocks with Islamic bank. Panel B presents the regression results when we 
introduce the interaction terms for oil and gas price shocks with both Islamic and conventional 
banks. The results of Sargan tests, AR(1) and AR(2), and lagged dependent variable in all 
models are valid and support our use of the two-step ystem GMM estimator. 
The results in Table 5 show a significant differenc in the impact of oil and gas price 
shocks on the performance of Islamic and conventional banks. More specifically, Panels A and B 
show that the interaction of shocks with Islamic bank dummy is negative and significant at the 
level of 1%. Panel B reports that the interaction with conventional bank dummy is positive and 
significant at 1% level. These robust results suggest that the significant impact of oil and gas 
price shocks is mainly channelled through conventional banks. The results also confirm that 
conventional banks in oil and gas-exporting countries are more affected by oil and gas price 
shocks regardless of benchmark indices for crude oil price (Brent or WTI) as well as the 
definition of the oil and gas prices shocks. These r ults support our hypothesis (H1a) but are not 
consistent with the results of Poghosyan and Hesse (2016), who find that oil price changes have 
no significant impact on Islamic and conventional bnks over the period 1994-2007. This result 
is not in line with the results of Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2018a) who find that Islamic banks in Qatar 
greatly benefit from increased cash flow created by the rise in oil and gas prices, which make 
their average non-performing loans much lower than that in conventional banks. It is clear that 
conventional banks benefit more than Islamic banks from oil and gas price-induced liquidity and 
increased economic activity (fee income and launching new investment projects) due to positive 
oil and gas price shocks. 
 
[ Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.3. The asymmetric effect of positive and negative oil and gas price shocks on bank 
performance 
 
            Sadorsky (2008) argues that changes in the demand and supply conditions of oil and gas, 
geopolitical turbulence, and changes in the structue of institutional arrangements affect oil and 
gas prices. Volatility in oil and gas prices has a significant adverse effect on firm performance in 
the oil and gas-exporting nations. Downturns in the oil and gas prices result in lowering the 
income of governments and reduce government spending. This adversely affects the financial 
performances of private agencies which rely on governm nt contracts. Husain et al. (2015) argue 
that the fall in oil and gas prices increases the country-risk profile of the oil and gas-exporting 
nations. In effect, the fall in price reduces the financial stability of these countries. However, 
upturns in price result in improvement in corporate performance, improve the quality of loans 
portfolio and hence, the performance of banks (IMF, 2015). Against this backdrop, we assess 
whether oil and gas price shocks have any asymmetric ffects on the performance of various 
categories of bank in the oil and gas-exporting countries. Following Hamilton (2003), Poghosyan 





shocks (oil and gas price up) and negative oil and gas price shocks (oil and gas price down) as 
follows9: 
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Table 6 reports the effect of positive (upward price) and negative (downward price) of oil 
and gas price shocks on the performance of banks as an aggregate level as well as of 
conventional and Islamic banks in oil and gas-exporting countries.  
At the aggregate level, the estimated coefficients of the oil and gas price rise (Columns 1 
and 5) on bank performance (Tobin’s Q and ROE) indicate that the effect is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The opposite is true for the drop in oil and gas prices 
(Columns 3 and 7). We also find that negative oil and gas price movements have a greater impact 
on bank performance than positive oil and gas price movements (models 1 and 5 versus models 3 
and 7). These results support our hypothesis (H1b). 
We find that rise and fall in oil and gas prices have n asymmetric effect on conventional 
and Islamic banks (models 2 and 6 versus models 4 and 8). The rises have a higher positive 
impact on the performance of conventional banks than Islamic banks (Columns 2 and 6). 
However, a drop in oil and gas prices has a higher negative impact on the performance of Islamic 
banks than conventional banks (Columns 4 and 8). The results also reveal that oil and gas price 
up shocks are asymmetric to oil and gas price down shocks in both conventional and Islamic 
banks. It appears that, in oil-exporting economies, conventional banks benefit most from positive 
oil price shocks, and Islamic banks lose most from negative oil price shocks. This may indicate 
that when oil prices fall, conventional banks in oil-exporting countries adjust their costs more 
efficiently than Islamic banks. This may be due to differences in the business models between 
these two banking groups. While the basic model of conventional banks is ‘lending’, it is 
‘investing’ in the case of Islamic banks. The lending activities of conventional banks tend to 
grow fast with the rise in oil and gas prices, and due to their exuberance banks often become 
overstretched in their lending activities. As a result, as the cycle turns and there is a drop in oil 
and gas prices and the economies slow down, this adversely affects corporate performance 
resulting in a high level of non-performing loans in the books of conventional banks. This 
adversely affects the performance of the banks in this group. As the Islamic banks are engaged in 
investment activities, with the drop in oil and gas prices which results in a precipitous fall in the 
health of corporates, banks in this group suffer moe deeply than conventional banks. 
In short, the results presented in Table 6 indicate that there is statistically significant 
evidence that oil and gas price movements have asymmetric impacts on conventional and Islamic 
bank performance in oil and gas-exporting countries. Moreover, the adverse impact of a drop in 
oil and gas prices is greater than the favourable impact due to a rise in price. We also find that 
the significant effect of adverse oil and gas price shocks is mainly channelled through Islamic 
                                                          
9 For further investigation of the impact of oil and gas price shocks on bank performance, we also incorporate in the 
model additional independent variables that might affect it: interest rate, unemployment rate, exchange rate, and 





banks. However, the significant effect of positive oil and gas price shocks is mainly channelled 
through conventional banks. 
 [ Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5.4. Robustness tests 
 
5.4.1. Controlling for the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring revolution and the Yemen War 
 
A distinct line of literature has grown in recent years that emphasize the role of country 
risk (financial and political risk) on bank performance, whose effect can permeate through 
multiple channels. Fu et al. (2014) report a significant impact of financial crises on bank 
performance in high-income economies, with a mixed effect in medium- and low-income 
economies. During the global financial crisis of 2008, GCC banks, especially those in Kuwait, 
Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, reported a declin  in profitability in that year10. 2008 was 
also the year in which the oil price reached its peak. This finding suggests that there was an 
apparent break in the relationship between bank profitability and oil price in 2008. In other 
words, the financial crisis significantly dampened the positive influence of oil price rise on the 
profit performance of banks. 
Political uncertainty is another channel of country risk. The Arab Spring is one of the 
most significant events to have adversely affected th  Arab world as a whole. Extreme political 
uncertainties, the resulting regime changes and instability resulted in economic hardships. 
However, post-crisis, due to minimal exposure of banks in the toxic assets, and favourable oil 
price movements, the Arab countries recovered faster than the Western economies. Since the 
political regimes in GCC are different from their Aab counterparts, and the GCC economies 
benefit from the rise in oil prices and the consequent rapid economic development, we expect 
GCC economies, and hence the performance of banks, to be immune to the effect of the Arab 
Spring. However, Ghosh (2016) reports that turmoil during the Arab Spring increased bank risk 
and adversely affected their profitability.  
The third major event that the GCC countries witnessed is the Yemen War. In the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring Revolution, the GCC countries recovered rapidly, boosted by oil 
and gas prices. However, by the beginning of 2015, the Yemen War began to emerge. It put 
increasing pressure on the economies of oil-producing Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. The problem was attenuated with the declin in oil and gas prices following the global 
financial crisis, decreased investor confidence, and the fall in tourist arrivals. Increased fear and 
anxiety resulted in adverse business sentiment, delaying the execution of ongoing projects. These 
developments also affected the initiatives of GCC governments to diversify the sources of 
income away from oil and gas exports. 
                                                          
10 The global financial crisis has revealed that the GCC banking sector has some vulnerability such as exposure to 
equity prices, the real estate sector, and increased reliance on external financing (Al-Hassan et al., 2010). Central 
banks in the GCC economies had initiated steps to tide over the stress arising out of the global financi l crisis. For 
example, the Central Bank of Kuwait halted trading i  Gulf Bank shares after it suffered major losses in foreign 
currency derivative contracts in 2008. Qatar governme t authorities invested in the stocks of its banks. The central 
banks in UAE and Saudi Arabia injected liquidity into their banking sector. To maintain the confidence lev l in the 
financial system, the governments in Kuwait and the UAE moved to guarantee deposits. Dubai’s debt crisis and the 
default of the two larger business groups (Saad and Al Gosaibi) in Saudi Arabia are indicative of the potential 






Such developments raise the question of the impact of the global financial crisis, the Arab 
Spring revolution and the Yemen War on the relationship between oil and gas price movements 
and bank performance. To determine whether country risk influences the relationship between 
oil price and bank performance and whether these factors enhance or weaken this relationship, 
we not only adopt dummies for the crisis, the Arab Spring and Yemen War, but we also include 
an interaction with a crisis dummy, an interaction with the Arab Spring, as well as an interaction 
with the Yemen War. We adopt 2008-2009 as the period of the global financial crisis in line with 
the work of Fu et al. (2014). The time dummy for the global financial crisis in our analysis takes 
the value of 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise. Following the work of Ghosh (2016), 
we use two measures for the Arab Spring revolution. We use the Arab Spring as a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the year is 2011 and 2012 and 0 otherwise (Arab Spring_year). We also 
use Arab Spring as a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is severely affected by the Arab 
Spring in the years 2011-2012 and 0 otherwise (Arab Spring_country). Similarly, we use two 
measures for the the Yemen War. We use Yemen War as  dummy variable equal to 1 if the year 
is 2015, 2016 or 2017 and 0 otherwise (Yemen War_year). We use the Yemen War as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a country (Saudi and the UAE) is involved in the war in Yemen in the years 
2015 to 2017 and 0 otherwise (Yemen War_country).  
Table 7 reports the results. Models 1-4 show the results for Brent oil price shocks, and 
models 5-8 those for natural gas price shocks. Our results indicate that controlling for the global 
financial crisis, the Arab Spring and the Yemen War provides outcomes similar to the primary 
results. The rise in oil and gas prices resulted in higher lending, higher cost efficiency, higher 
NIM, higher profit, and higher shareholder value of banks in the oil and gas-exporting countries. 
Banks with higher capital adequacy positions are found to be more prudent in their supervision 
and monitoring of their lending books, adopting superior risk management practices during the 
phase of instability. However, the relationship between oil and gas price shocks assessed by 
Hamilton’s measure and banks’ ROE, ROA, and NIM has become insignificant when we control 
for the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring and the Yemen War. The significant effect of oil 
and gas price shocks on Tobin’s Q has decreased from 1% to 5% levels. This finding indicates 
that the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and the Yemen War have distorted the 
relationship between oil and gas price shocks and bank performance. It confirms that the impact 
of global shocks other than oil and gas price developments should be taken into account when 
analyzing the relationship between oil and gas price shocks and bank performance.  
As far as the impact of the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and the Yemen War 
are concerned, our results indicate that the global fin ncial crisis and all measures of political 
instability (Arab Spring and Yemen War) have a negative impact on all proxies of bank 
performance in the GCC countries. Political uncertainty can rapidly affect economic 
developments, especially as the GCC countries. In comparison with the banks in other GCC 
economies, the negative impact is more prominent in the performance of banks in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE. This highlights the need to invest more resources to strengthen banks’ risk 
management practices and in the supervision and monitoring of projects. Such steps would 
enable the banks to tide over the challenges during the economic and political crises. Our 
findings are consistent with those of Ghosh (2016) who finds political instability has a negative 
impact on bank performance. 
 
 






5.4.2. Distinguishing between the direct and indirect impacts of oil and gas price shocks on bank 
performance 
 
We consider alternative models with a smaller number of parameters: to distinguish 
between the direct and indirect impacts of oil and gas price shocks, we examine definitions of 
these shocks with bank-specific factors (proposed by Poghosyan and Hesse, 2016). If the impact 
of oil and gas price shocks remains significant when other macro-economic variables and 
financial structure indicators are excluded from the model specification, then this study would 
confirm that the shocks have a direct impact on bank performance in oil and gas-exporting 
countries. Appendix A shows that the effect of the s ocks on measures of bank performance 
remain significant at 1% level even when the other macro-economic and financial indicators 
(country-specific) are excluded from the model specification. This finding implies that there is a 
direct effect of oil and gas price shocks on the performance of banks in oil and gas-exporting 
countries. These findings also indicate that banks i  oil and gas-exporting countries greatly 
benefit from increased cash flow due to rising oil and gas prices, which improves their 
performance. In general, the results confirm that te inclusion or exclusion of macro-economic 
and financial indicators have not affected the main findings of our study. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The linkage between oil and gas prices and the economic development of the oil and gas-
exporting nations indicates the existence of a positive association between the two. There is, 
however, little literature on the possible impact of oil and gas price shocks on the performance of 
banks in the oil and gas-exporting countries like th GCC, where economic growth leads the 
growth in the banking activities. Our study fills this gap by examining the impact of oil (WTI 
and Brent indices) and gas price shocks on bank performance and also its differential impact on 
conventional and Islamic banks. We also examine whether positive and negative oil and gas 
price shocks have any asymmetric effects on performance. Our study also takes a fresh look at 
how political uncertainty (global financial crisis, the Arab Spring and the ongoing war in 
Yemen) affect the performance of banks and shape the relationship between oil and gas prices 
and bank performance in the major oil and gas-exporting nations. 
Our results, based on the analysis of panel data for 18 years on 45 conventional and 25 
Islamic listed banks in the GCC using two-step GMM, suggest that oil and gas price shocks have 
a direct impact on the performance of banks in oil and gas-exporting countries. Increases 
(decreases) in oil and gas prices improve (reduce) bank performance. These results hold true 
regardless of the oil and gas indices used or the definition of the oil and gas prices shocks. Our 
empirical findings lend support for the direct channel hypothesis that assumes that oil and gas 
price shocks could affect bank performance directly via increased oil and gas-related lending or 
business activity. Furthermore, changes in oil and gas prices have an asymmetric effect on bank 
performance: increases have a different impact from declining oil and gas prices, with negative 
shocks having a greater effect than positive shocks. However, oil and gas price movements have 
different effects on the performance of conventional as opposed to Islamic banks. While Islamic 
banks are generally vulnerable to adverse oil and gas price shocks, conventional banks tend to 





More interestingly, we find that the relationship between oil and gas prices shocks and 
bank performance has been distorted by the global fin ncial crisis of 2008, the Arab Spring 
revolution of 2011, and the Yemen War from 2015. This finding suggests that the impact of 
global shocks other than oil and gas price developments should be taken into cognizance in 
analyzing the relationship between oil and gas price shocks and bank profitability. Our analysis 
also indicates that the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring and the Yemen War lowered bank 
performance. Our results are consistent with evidence which highlights the adverse impact of 
political uncertainty on bank behaviour. 
The findings of our study will prove immensely beneficial to the central banks as well as 
other policy planners in the oil and gas-exporting nations. First, the study highlights that as the 
increased fiscal spending by governments during an environment of rising oil and gas prices has 
a direct bearing on bank performance, the regulators should be able to design new control 
mechanisms to check the ebullience in lending by banks during the said period, to obviate the 
fall-out in the aftermath of the bullish behaviour. The same is applicable to both conventional 
and Islamic banks, although more so for conventional banks where the effect of such rise is more 
pronounced. Given the fact that oil and gas prices ar  easier to monitor than the commonly used 
measures of the business cycle, oil and gas price shock  can be used for macro-prudential 
regulatory purposes. The study strongly argues for putting in place additional variables that link 
oil and gas price shocks with the level of bank capitalization to mitigate the pro-cyclical lending 
behaviour of banks. One can argue for the creation of suitable capital buffers in banks to ensure 
systemic stability during various periods of crisis.  
Second, the findings that government spending in the oil and gas-exporting economies 
has a direct bearing on bank performance indicates th  need for putting into action appropriate 
macro-prudential policy interventions to sterilize the effect of oil and gas price induced boom 
and bust on bank performance. Notwithstanding the effort of the oil and gas-exporting countries 
to diversify their economies away from oil and gas, there is an urgent need for faster adoption of 
the Basel-III standards. Central banks of the GCC economies need to nudge the banks to create 
‘counter-cyclical capital buffers’ to stave off the effects of cyclicality in oil and gas prices on 
their financial health and hence systemic stability; this would be in addition to the requirement 
for a ‘capital conservation buffer’ proposed in Basel-III.   
Third, it appears that despite the entry barriers to foreign banks in the GCC markets, they 
were affected by the 2008 financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and the Yemen War and were not 
insulated from the shocks to the international stock markets. One can, therefore, argue for 
stronger regional policy coordination amongst the GCC countries to reduce stock market 
sensitivity to stochastic shocks. Moreover, as the stocks from most GCC countries have positive 
sensitivities to oil and gas price changes, from the perspective of the international investors, 
when these stocks are included in a portfolio of stcks from oil and gas-importing countries, 
generally with negative sensitivities to oil and gas price changes, this would result in lowering 
risk.  
Further research to understand lenders’ dilemma during various phases of oil and gas 
price-induced lending growth would undoubtedly facilitate more robust parameterization of 
regulatory interventions to control banking behaviour in the oil and gas-exporting nations. In 
addition, future research effort is needed to identify the channels through which oil and gas 
prices may affect bank performance. It needs to address whether this a demand-driven 
phenomenon or could be due to supply-side effects affecting firms’ cost of capital/borrowing. 





performance across various cross-section banks. It would be beneficial if future research could 
assess whether banks in countries with higher oil and gas production are more influenced by 
energy price changes than the others. 
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Variables definition and expected sign. 




Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets Bankscope 
ROE Net profits over average total equity  Bankscope 
ROA  Net profits over average total assets  Bankscope 
NIM Net interest income to total assets  Bankscope 
   
Independent variables   
 
Oil and Gas prices shocks:  
 
  
Brent oil prices shocks:  Own calculation based on 
data from Bloomberg 
Database   
 
Annual percentage change Annual percentage change of Br nt oil prices 
Annual growth rate Annual growth rates of Brent oil prices 
Deviation from forward rate Brent Oil prices deviation from 12 months forward rate 
Deviation from HP filter Brent Oil prices deviation from HP filter 
Hamilton (2003) oil shock Hamilton (2003) definition f Brent oil prices shocks  
Brent oil price up Hamilton (2003) measure of the Brent oil price increase (positive) 
Brent oil price down Hamilton (2003) measure of the Br nt oil price decrease (negative) 
   
WTI oil prices shocks:   
Annual percentage change Annual percentage change of WTI oil prices Own calculation based on 
data from Bloomberg 
Database   
 
Annual growth rate Annual growth rates of WTI oil prices 
Deviation from forward rate WTI Oil prices deviation from 12 months forward rate  
Deviation from HP filter WTI Oil prices deviation from HP filter  
Hamilton (2003) oil shock Hamilton (2003) definition of oil prices shocks of WTI oil prices 
WTI oil price up  Hamilton (2003) measure of the WTI oil price increase (positive) 
WTI oil price down Hamilton (2003) measure of the WTI oil price decrease (negative) 
   
Natural gas prices shocks:   
Annual percentage change Annual percentage change of natural gas prices Own calculation based on 
data from Bloomberg 
Database   
 
Annual growth rate Annual growth rates of natural gas prices 
Deviation from forward rate Natural gas prices deviation from 12 months forward rate 
Deviation from HP filter Natural gas prices deviation from HP filter 
Hamilton (2003) oil shock Hamilton (2003) definition f natural gas prices  
Natural gas price up Hamilton (2003) measure of the natural gas price increase (positive) 
Natural gas price down Hamilton (2003) measure of the natural gas price decrease (negative) 
   
Bank-specific characteristics:   
Cost-income-ratio  Operating expenses to total income  Bankscope 
Non-interest revenue Non-interest revenue to total revenue Bankscope 
Liquidity risk Net loans divided by customers and short-term funding  Bankscope 
Non-performing loans Non-performing loans to total lo ns Bankscope 
Capital adequacy ratio Equity to total assets  Bankscope 




GDP growth Annual growth rate of GDP  WDI 
Fiscal stance Government surplus/deficit to GDP IMF 
Inflation rate Current period inflation rate (consumer prices) WDI 
 
Financial Structure Indicators:  
  
Herfindahl index Sum of the squared each bank's total assets to total banking sector assets  Bankscope 




 Summary statistics of entire sample by variables  Mean value for each variable for banks by country 
 
























     
           
Tobin’s Q 0.48 0.26 0.12 1.68  0.48  0.52  0.36  0.57  0.50  0.39 
ROE 12.00 11.33 -51.86 35.53  6.74  9.92  11.51  16.34  16.53  12.46 























Oil price shocks: 
    
 
           
Brent oil prices shocks:     
            
Annual percentage change  11.04 28.18 -47.14 60.10             
Annual growth rates of Brent  4.73 19.52 -43.53 33.99             
Dev. from HP  6.75 19.83 -42.49 38.06             
Dev. from 12m forward rate  -2.19 21.11 -44.33 22.15             
Hamilton (2003) definition  1.94 3.33 0.00 11.98             
Brent oil price up 1.94 3.33 0.00 11.98             
Brent oil price down -1.56 1.57 -5.48 -0.06            
                 
WTI Oil prices shocks:                 
Annual percentage change  9.78 26.78 -47.78 57.04             
Annual growth rates  3.90 18.70 -43.42 31.54             
Dev. from HP  6.58 19.43 -42.49 35.22             
Dev. from 12m forward rate  3.79 18.92 -44.46 31.89             
Hamilton (2003) definition  1.44 2.09 0.00 8.09            
WTI oil price up  1.44 2.09 0.00 8.09             
WTI oil price down -1.61 1.38 -5.46 -0.31             
 
Natural gas price shocks: 
    
 
           
Annual percentage change   7.54 37.32 -55.53 89.87             
Annual growth rates  0.53 24.52 -55.70 39.93             
Dev. from HP  0.44 24.52 -55.71 39.94             
Dev. from 12m forward rate  -4.74 23.72 -59.30 35.85             
Hamilton (2003) definition  0.18 0.31 0.00 0.91            
Natural gas price up 0.18 0.31 0.00 0.91             
Natural gas price down -0.09 0.24 -1.01 0.00             
 
Bank-specific factors: 
    
 
           
Cost-income-ratio 43.10 26.42 15.70 219.12  57.74  37.10  45.57  29.27  38.33  36.72 
Non-interest revenue 35.56 22.80 0.26 149.25  51.51  30.86  25.38  31.21  34.18  31.80 
Liquidity risk 76.45 25.49 3.28 152.21  53.36  78.41  90.26  78.97  74.49  89.33 
Non-performing loans 6.51 10.27 0.06 71.22  12.03  5.01  5.39  2.28  2.04  5.24 
Capital adequacy ratio 17.03 10.36 7.18 76.39  18.38  13.15  13.49  16.58  14.53  16.19 
Bank size 15.66 1.43 11.53 18.30  15.09  16.24  15.21  16.34  16.89  16.27 
 
Macroeconomic indicators: 
    
 
           
GDP growth 5.34 4.70 -7.08 26.17  4.99  3.92  4.03  11.94  5.68  3.73 
Fiscal stance 8.17 11.62 -15.95 43.17  -3.18  27.17  5.30  11.63  7.56  6.15 
Inflation rate 3.16 3.40 -4.86 15.05  2.37  4.10  3.31  4.39  3.63  3.92 
 
Financial Structure Indicators: 
    
 
           
Herfindahl index 110.07 343.78 0.0013 3508.17  80.94  106.91  206.92  335.30  24.28  40.35 
Stock market capitalization 63.84 39.39 5.49 196.71  80.93  101.48  39.61  95.48  80.31  35.11 
The table shows the summary statistics of the variables used in our regression analyses of entire sample 2000-2017 as well as the means of the variables us d by the 





No. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Tobin’s Q 1    
2 ROE 0.1965*** 1   
3 ROA 0.2995*** 0.7640*** 1                
4 NIM 0.057 0.2626*** 0.3993*** 1 
5 Cost-income-ratio -0.0067 -0.516*** -0.584*** -0.279*** 1 
6 Non-Interest revenue 0.2420*** -0.0734** -0.0185 -0.591*** 0.2512*** 1 
7 Liquidity risk -0.129*** 0.0883*** 0.1611*** 0.4790*** -0.0722** -0.450*** 1 
8 Non-performing loans 0.0374 -0.381*** -0.367*** -0.276*** 0.3968*** 0.3626*** -0.421*** 1 
9 Capital adequacy ratio 0.3763*** -0.162*** 0.1948*** 0.0895*** 0.3294*** 0.2183*** 0.1256*** 0.0911*** 1 
         10 Bank size -0.272*** 0.2421*** 0.0032 -0.0081 -0.384*** -0.263*** 0.0445 -0.421*** -0.518*** 1 
11 GDP growth 0.2350*** 0.2054*** 0.2028*** -0.0193 -0.125*** 0.0649** -0.0577 -0.0765** 0.0591* -0.0353 1 
       12 Fiscal Stance 0.2151*** 0.1748*** 0.1087*** 0.0969*** -0.206*** -0.092*** 0.1026*** -0.151*** -0.088*** 0.1318*** 0.1879*** 1 
13 Inflation rate 0.1155*** 0.1083*** 0.0983*** 0.0155 -0.127*** 0.0429 0.1544*** -0.182*** -0.0092 0.1116*** 0.2397*** 0.3292*** 1 
     14 Herfindahl index -0.0267 0.0562* -0.008 -0.0427 -0.090*** -0.074** -0.0008 -0.0839 -0.133*** 0.2390*** 0.1131*** 0.0128 -0.0115 1 
15 Market capitalization 0.5502*** 0.1638*** 0.1632*** -0.130*** -0.0619* 0.1949*** -0.235*** -0.0399 0.0196 0.0684** 0.2930*** 0.2741*** 0.0582* 0.0787** 1 
16 WTI Oil prices shocks 0.2613*** 0.1486*** 0.1641*** 0.0269 -0.0672* 0.0831*** -0.0741** 0.0558* 0.043 -0.180*** 0.4006*** 0.3747*** 0.1761*** 0.0002 0.0664** 1 
17 Brent Oil prices shocks 0.2532*** 0.1423*** 0.1644*** 0.027 -0.0594* 0.0848*** -0.0754** 0.0605* 0.0491 -0.175*** 0.3976*** 0.3704*** 0.1519*** -0.0008 0.0651** 0.9787*** 1 
18 Natural Gas prices shocks 0.2051*** 0.1053*** 0.0831*** 0.0164 -0.024 0.0247** -0.0713** 0.0548* -0.0051 -0.163*** 0.2367*** 0.2036*** -0.011 0.0197 0.0313 0.8593*** 0.7861*** 1 




Regression results of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance equation. Do oil and gas prices matter? 
 Panel A: Brent Oil Price Shocks  Panel B: Natural Gas Price Shocks 
Variables Tobin’s Q ROE  Tobin’s Q ROE 
 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
          
Lagt-1 0.486*** 0.485*** 0.119*** 0.161***  0.510*** 0.474*** 0.173*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0320) (0.00990) (0.0123)  (0.0282) (0.0324) (0.0163) (0.0162) 
Deviation from oil/gas forward rate 0.0764***  0.0471***   0.0202***  0.0874***  
 (0.0131)  (0.0101)   (0.0071)  (0.0208)  
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  0.0894***  0.624***   0.0968***  0.463** 
  (0.0221)  (0.207)   (0.0159)  (0.2481) 
Cost-income-ratio -0.0541**  -0.0177 -0.304*** -0.194***  -0.0658**  -0.0410 -0.198*** -0.183*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0271) (0.0078) (0.0094)  (0.0277) (0.0272) (0.00973) (0.0109) 
Non-interest revenue 0.069*** 0.0434* 0.175*** 0.178***  0.0224 0.0230 0.179*** 0.190*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0229) (0.00759) (0.00862)  (0.0226) (0.0229) (0.0093) (0.0083) 
Liquidity risk -0.0121 -0.0461 0.0630 0.0113  -0.0493 -0.0426 0.0048 0.00696 
 (0.0201) (0.0355) (0.0760) (0.0106)  (0.0346) (0.0354) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
Non-performing loans -0.0212***  -0.0962** -0.305*** -0.157***  -0.0108** -0.0107** -0.149*** -0.146*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0477) (0.0342) (0.0130)  (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Capital adequacy ratio 0.0921* 0.0331*** -0.163*** -0.200***  0.0333*** 0.0304*** -0.152*** -0.145*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0089) (0.0471) (0.0427)  (0.0081) (0.0094) (0.0450) (0.0412) 
Bank size 0.0141 -0.0107 1.051 0.302  -0.0945 0.0124 0.399 0.830 
 (0.0746) (0.0079) (1.087) (0.873)  (0.0817) (0.0745) (0.856) (0.796) 
GDP growth 0.0586* 0.0499*** 0.143*** 0.0203  0.0480*** 0.0417*** 0.0429** 0.0687** 
 (0.0298) (0.0154) (0.0418) (0.0413)  (0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0212) (0.0341) 
Fiscal stance 0.0260*** 0.0354*** 0.0450 0.0599*  0.0355*** 0.0331*** 0.00833 0.0718* 
 (0.0046) (0.0067) (0.0284) (0.0306)  (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0385) (0.0403) 
Inflation rate -0.0212** -0.0159 -0.161*** -0.317**  -0.0338** -0.0158 -0.286*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0154) (0.0412) (0.0942)  (0.0155) (0.0140) (0.0694) (0.0817) 
Herfindahl index -0.0062*** -0.00587 0.0348 -0.0937***  -0.00352 -0.0938* -0.010*** -0.0703*** 
 (0.00131) (0.0053) (0.0229) (0.0280)  (0.00518) (0.0563) (0.0028) (0.026) 
Market capitalization 0.0117*** 0.0254*** 0.0183*** 0.0318  0.0265*** 0.0247*** -0.0255* -0.0228 
 (0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0690)  (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0135) (0.0708) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0499 -0.238* -101.5*** 3.482  -0.225 -0.203 -0.103 -20.91 
 (0.136) (0.136) (22.43) (15.86)  (0.147) (0.150) (22.93) (17.61) 
Number of observations 875 875 1070 1070  875 875 1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69 70 70  69 69 70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.208 0.200 0.167 0.154  0.192 0.227 0.143 0.156 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.579 0.711 0.582 0.579  0.599 0.602 0.599 0.599 
This table describes outcomes of the effects of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance using two-step system GMM estimations by Arellano and 
Bover (1995). The dependent variables are the Tobin’s Q and ROE. For the variables notation see Table 1. The period covers the years from 2000 to 2017.  
Standard errors are in brackets. Capital adequacy rtio is modeled as endogenous variable, and non-performing loans as predetermined variable. The 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average 
autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). Coefficients that are significantly various from zero at the 10%, 5 , 









Regression results of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance equation: Which banks are most affected? 
 Brent Oil Price Shocks  Natural Gas Price Shocks 
Variables Tobin’s Q ROE  Tobin’s Q ROE 
 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
          
Panel A: Islamic banks with interaction terms for oil 
and gas price shocks with Islamic banks. 
 
         
Lagt-1 0.456*** 0.391*** 0.328*** 0.324***  0.418*** 0.426*** 0.392*** 0.329*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0146) (0.0650) (0.0188)  (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0171) (0.0170) 
Deviation from oil/gas forward rate 0.0183***  0.0447***   0.0205***  0.0734**  
 (0.0037)  (0.0148)   (0.00169)  (0.0307)  
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  0.0462***  0.210***   0.0693***  0.296** 
  (0.0059)  (0.0225)   (0.0066)  (0.142) 
Islamic banks -0.0232** -0.0371**  -1.406 -4.879***  -0.0940*** -0.0116 -2.332*** -5.064*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0174) (1.602) (0.725)  (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.834) (0.695) 
Islamic banks × Deviation oil/gas forward rate -0.0529***  -0.150***   -0.0443***  -0.0839***  
 (0.00623)  (0.0272)   (0.0035)  (0.0075)  
Islamic banks × Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  -0.0130***  -0.496***   -0.145***  -2.054*** 
  (0.00092)  (0.0379)   (0.0165)  (0.450) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 875 875 1070 1070  875 875 1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69 70 70  69 69 70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.467 0.572 0.355 0.546  0.726 0.525 0.542 0.527 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.753 0.856 0.431 0.627  0.43  0.303 0.951 0.814 
          
Panel B: Interaction terms for oil and gas price 
shocks with Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
         
Lagt-1 0.448*** 0.384*** 0.296*** 0.329***  0.413*** 0.424*** 0.397*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0139) (0.0475) (0.0164)  (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0169) (0.0170) 
Deviation from oil/gas forward rate No No No No  No No No No 
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock No No No No  No No No No 
Islamic banks × Deviation oil/gas forward rate -0.0347***   -0.104***   -0.0137***   -0.102***  
 (0.0042)  (0.0170)   (0.0022)  (0.0056)  
Conventional banks ×Deviation oil/gas forward rate 0.0172***  0.0242***   0.0159***  0.0701***  
 (0.0036)  (0.0015)   (0.0012)  (0.0144)  
Islamic banks × Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  -0.0799***  -0.148***   -0.0773***  -0.777*** 
  (0.0066)  (0.0323)   (0.0129)  (0.280) 
Conventional banks ×Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  0.0432***  0.128***   0.0770***  0.778*** 
  (0.0047)  (0.0176)   (0.0053)  (0.146) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 875 875 1070 1070  875 875 1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69 70 70  69 69 70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.441 0.518 0.271 0.550  0.623 0.445 0.573 0.579 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.750 0.963 0.516 0.874  0.26  0.370 0.883 0.946 
This table describes outcomes of the effects of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance using two-step system GMM estimations by Arellano and Bover (1995). The 
dependent variables are the Tobin’s Q and ROE. For the variables notation see Table 1. The period covers th  years from 2000 to 2017.  Standard errors are in brackets. Capital 
adequacy ratio is modeled as endogenous variable, and non-performing loans as predetermined variable. Th  Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM 
estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residual  of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 







Regression results of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance equation: Asymmetric effect of positive and negative oil and gas price shocks. 
 Panel A: Brent Oil Price Shocks  Panel B: Natural Gas Price Shocks 
Variables 
Oil  price up  
(positive shocks)  
Oil price down  
(negative shocks) 
 Gas  price up  
(positive shocks)  
Gas price down  
(negative shocks) 
 All banks Islamic vs  
conventional  
banks 
 All banks Islamic vs  
conventional  
banks 
 All banks Islamic vs  
conventional  
banks 
 All banks Islamic vs  
conventional  
banks 
 1 2  3 4  5 6  7 8 
 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
           
Lag Tobin’s Q t-1 0.405*** 0.401***  0.399*** 0.406***  0.415*** 0.395***  0.388*** 0.389*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0236)  (0.0176) (0.0243)  (0.0152) (0.0182)  (0.0205) (0.0224) 
Oil/gas prices up (positive shocks) 0.0108*** 0.0374***     0.0247*** 0.0795***    
 (0.00398) (0.00769)     (0.0080) (0.0199)    
Oil/gas prices down (negative shocks)   -0.0393*** -0.0317**     -0.0589*** -0.0491*** 
    (0.0131) (0.0128)     (0.0064) (0.0177) 
Islamic banks  -0.0453**   0.0876   -0.0342*   0.0459 
  (0.0208)   (0.0662)   (0.0190)   (0.0303) 
Islamic banks × Oil/gas prices up  -0.0993***      -0.246***    
  (0.0127)      (0.0466)    
Islamic banks × Oil/gas prices down     0.0171**      0.0799*** 
     (0.0077)      (0.0294) 
Country dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 875 875  1070 1070  875 875  1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69  70 70  69 69  70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.572 0.471  0.290 0.360  0.228 0.461  0.307 0.521 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.156 0.135  0.653 0.141  0.173 0.114  0.210 0.166 
            
Dependent variable: ROE            
Lag ROE t-1 0.265*** 0.262***  0.295*** 0.318***  0.279*** 0.278***  0.342*** 0.372*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0239)  (0.0209) (0.0254)  (0.0247) (0.0236)  (0.0249) (0.0245) 
Oil/gas prices up (positive shocks) 0.0597*** 0.142***     1.264*** 0.210***     
 (0.0153) (0.0218)     (0.259) (0.042)    
Oil/gas prices down (negative shocks)   -0.874*** -0.780***     -4.914*** -2.453*** 
    (0.0389) (0.0681)     (0.279) (0.544) 
Islamic banks  -2.764***   0.916   -2.608***   0.940* 
  (0.737)   (0.801)   (0.770)   (0.505) 
Islamic banks × Oil/gas prices up  -0.353***      -4.798***    
  (0.0424)      (1.437)    
Islamic banks × Oil/gas prices down     0.172***      6.321*** 
     (0.0236)      (1.393) 
Country dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 875 875  1070 1070  875 875  1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69  70 70  69 69  70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.459 0.403  0.387 0.417  0.413 0.418  0.393 0.340 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.788 0.699  0.805 0.506  0.907 0.875  0.744 0.842 
This table describes outcomes of the effects of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance using two-step system GMM estimations by Arellano and Bover (1995). The 
dependent variables are the Tobin’s Q and ROE. For the variables notation see Table 1. The period covers the years from 2000 to 2017.  Standard errors are in brackets. Capital 
adequacy ratio is modeled as endogenous variable, and non-performing loans as predetermined variable. Th  Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM 
estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residual  of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 






Regression results for oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance: Controlling for the global financial crisis, Arab Spring, and the Yemen War (robustness check 1). 
 Panel A: Brent Oil Price Shocks  Panel B: Natural Gas Price Shocks 
Variables Tobin’s Q ROE  Tobin’s Q ROE 
 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
          
Lagt-1 0.524*** 0.365*** 0.446*** 0.399***  0.403*** 0.405*** 0.402*** 0.406*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0166) (0.0248) (0.0247)  (0.0171) (0.025) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
Deviation from oil/gas forward rate 0.0124***  0.0460***   0.0313***  0.0183***  
 (0.0013)  (0.0144)   (0.0028)  (0.00409)  
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  0.0557**  0.0787   0.0785**  0.131 
  (0.0283)  (0.0816)   (0.0373)  (0.137) 
Global financial crisis -0.0755*** -0.0585*** -2.463*** -3.445***  -0.0251** -0.0610*** -3.054*** -3.643*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0059) (0.254) (0.241)  (0.0107) (0.0096) (0.278) (0.336) 
Arab Spring _year -0.0533*** -0.0535*** -0.355* -0.592***  -0.0164** -0.0316*** -0.136** -0.609** 
 (0.0060) (0.0079) (0.196) (0.218)  (0.00762) (0.0079) (0.0590) (0.248) 
Arab Spring _country -0.135*** -0.191*** -0.295* -1.628**  -0.190*** -0.193*** -1.157* -0.461* 
 (0.0117) (0.0162) (0.154) (0.634)  (0.0157) (0.0132) (0.616) (0.259) 
Yemen War _year -0.164*** -0.142*** -3.278*** -2.670***  -0.132*** -0.131*** -1.833* -2.204** 
 (0.0153) (0.0266) (0.444) (0.897)  (0.0307) (0.0336) (1.105) (0.932) 
Yemen War _country -0.0570*** -0.112** -2.994*** -3.504**  -0.130** -0.0727** -3.607* -3.520* 
 (0.0202) (0.0519) (0.872) (1.355)  (0.0638) (0.0310) (2.192) (1.965) 
Deviation oil/gas forward rate × Crisis   -0.0108***  -0.145***   -0.0243***  -0.109***  
 (0.0018)  (0.0173)   (0.0024)  (0.00578)  
Deviation oil/gas forward rate × Arab Spring _year -0.0568**  -0.0163   -0.0194***  -0.00904  
 (0.0213)  (0.0126)   (0.0039)  (0.0121)  
Deviation oil/gas forward rate × Arab Spring _country -0.035***  -0.0624***   -0.0704***  0.0498  
 (0.0062)  (0.0150)   (0.0070)  (0.0402)  
Deviation oil/gas forward rate × Yemen War _year -0.0349***  -0.147***   -0.0214**  -0.158***  
 (0.0041)  (0.0176)   (0.0108)  (0.0287)  
Deviation oil/gas forward rate × Yemen War _ country -0.0196***  -0.103***   -0.0186  -0.219***  
 (0.0053)  (0.0216)   (0.0210)  (0.0644)  
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock × Crisis    -0.0208***  -0.191*   -0.132***  -2.225*** 
  (0.00429)  (0.101)   (0.0142)  (0.405) 
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock × Arab Spring _year  -0.0176***  -0.115   -1.086***  -11.07 
  (0.00287)  (0.0846)   (0.296)  (8.374) 
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock × Arab Spring _country  -0.0765***   -0.102**   -4.208***  -30.39** 
  (0.0214)  (0.0396)   (0.684)  (15.32) 
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock × Yemen War _year  -0.0226***  -0.0409*   0.0571  0.0216 
  (0.0058)  (0.0234)   (0.0707)  (0.0478) 
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock × Yemen War _ country  -0.00267**  -0.0940   -0.00949  -0.0813 
  (0.00113)  (0.0596)   (0.0148)  (0.103) 
Number of observations 875 875 1070 1070  875 875 1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69 70 70  69 69 70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.125 0.208 0.175 0.159  0.179 0.156 0.106 0.189 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.068 0.030 0.041 0.051  0.031 0.041 0.049 0.019 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.674 0.534 0.565 0.563  0.578 0.578 0.640 0.613 
This table describes outcomes of the effects of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance using two-step system GMM estimations by Arellano and Bover (1995). The 
dependent variables are the Tobin’s Q and ROE. For the variables notation see Table 1. The period covers the years from 2000 to 2017.  Standard errors are in brackets. Capital 
adequacy ratio is modeled as endogenous variable, and non-performing loans as predetermined variable. The Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM 
estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in resdual  of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). Coefficients 






Appendix A  
Regression results for bank-specific factors and oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance: Dir ct or indirect oil and gas price effect (robustness check 2) 
 Panel A: Brent Oil Price Shocks  Panel B: Natural Gas Price Shocks 
Variables Tobin’s Q ROE  Tobin’s Q ROE 
 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
          
Lagt-1 0.482*** 0.357*** 0.321*** 0.289***  0.351*** 0.337*** 0.318*** 0.291*** 
 (0.00667) (0.0129) (0.00736) (0.0102)  (0.0161) (0.01 4) (0.0133) (0.0103) 
Deviation from oil/gas forward rate 0.0346***  0.0350***   0.0989***  0.0386***  
 (0.0034)  (0.0018)   (0.0046)  (0.0010)  
Hamilton (2003) oil/gas shock  0.0478***  0.0233***   0.0498***  0.430*** 
  (0.0018)  (0.0074)   (0.0033)  (0.0349) 
Cost-income-ratio -0.0384***  -0.0700***  -0.248*** -0.436***  -0.0711***  -0.0661***  -0.411*** -0.432*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0097)  (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0075) (0.0073) 
Non-interest revenue 0.0158** 0.0122*** 0.0851*** 0.0893***  0.0128*** 0.0104*** 0.0779*** 0.0838*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0013) (0.0041) (0.0102)  (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0076) (0.0087) 
Liquidity risk -0.0138 -0.0519* 0.0588* 0.0332  -0.0169 -0.0667* 0.0373 0.0332 
 (0.0103) (0.0276) (0.0330) (0.0640)  (0.0199) (0.0360) (0.0857) (0.0669) 
Non-performing loans -0.0108***  -0.0162** -0.469*** -0.292***  -0.0994* -0.0188***  -0.255*** -0.298*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0082) (0.0141) (0.0279)  (0.0557) (0.0039) (0.0336) (0.0353) 
Capital adequacy ratio 0.0566** 0.0676** -0.0355** -0.281***  0.0507*** 0.0546*** -0.229*** -0.276*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0318) (0.0173) (0.0444)  (0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0288) (0.0276) 
Bank size -0.0641* -0.110* -0.359 -0.294*  -0.104* -0.103* -0.650* -0.945* 
 (0.0335) (0.0625) (0.255) (0.153)  (0.0613) (0.0552) (0.334) (0.491) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.504*** 2.344*** 18.54*** 73.40***  2.209*** 2.215*** 66.84*** 73.18*** 
 (0.0560) (0.101) (2.901) (3.004)  (0.112) (0.0971) (2.815) (3.378) 
Number of observations 875 875 1070 1070  875 875 1070 1070 
Number of banks 69 69 70 70  69 69 70 70 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.189 0.208 0.189 0.172  0.156 0.137 0.227 0.233 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.013  0.016 0.015 0.011 0.011 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.594 0.617 0.636 0.653  0.642 0.673 0.595 0.606 
This table describes outcomes of the effects of oil and gas prices shocks on bank performance using two-step system GMM estimations by Arellano and Bover 
(1995). The dependent variables are the Tobin’s Q and ROE. For the variables notation see Table 1. The period covers the years from 2000 to 2017.  Standard errors 
are in brackets. Capital adequacy ratio is modeled as endogenous variable, and non-performing loans as predetermined variable. The Sargan test is the test for over-
identifying restrictions in GMM estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 rsp. of 
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